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A Review of Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison’s Objectivity
Tom Strong
Division of Applied Psychology, University of Calgary, Alberta, Canada
Lorraine Daston’s and Peter Galison’s Objectivity (2007) traces
historical and cultural developments as the word “objective” acquired
different meanings and associated scientific practices. Similarly, Daston
and Galison consider the changing relationship of the word “objective”
as it relates to the subjectivity of the researcher. Objectivity will interest
any reader interested in how the conceptions and practices of science
change historically and culturally. Key Words: Science, History,
Objectivity, and Qualitative Research.

A claim to objective knowledge is an absolute demand for obedience.
Mendez, Coddou, & Maturana, 1988, p. 170
The answer to the question “Why objectivity” lies precisely in the history of the
scientific self to be eliminated.
Daston & Galison, 2007, p. 197
Most qualitative researchers have at some point run up against the argument that
their research and science is not objective. The word objective implies a kind of rigor or
neutral omniscience that philosopher, Thomas Nagel (1989), aptly described as the “view
from nowhere.” Most people are willing to grant “objectivity” the status of an ideal, one
that methodologically rigorous, subjectively untainted, and expertly peer-reviewed,
research can hope to reflect and approximate. Deemed “objective,” such knowledge is
used to underwrite policy directives, act as the source of scientifically warranted practice,
and end controversies in social or other arenas where such controversies need to “be put
to rest.” Examined historically, objectivity has been a shifting human ideal, an ideal that
scientists have flirted with, fetishized, and modified to fit the cultural virtues of the day.
Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison have well-established track records as
scientists and historians of science at two of the world’s most renowned centres of
scientific knowledge: Germany’s Max Planck Institute and Harvard University. I first
encountered Peter Galison’s wonderful 2004 book, Einstein’s Clocks and Poincaré’s
Maps: Empires of Time, a few years ago where he highlighted the convergence of
ambitions and insights of scientists like Einstein and Poincaré, and the politics that went
into developing the world’s 24 hour clock and its related time zones. There, science and
its outcomes took on a very human face. But, it is precisely this humanness, and its
presumed downsides for science that motivated Daston and Galison (2007) to write
Objectivity.
Objectivity’s “evil twin” so to speak is subjectivity. For scientists, this realization
has prompted some historical variations metaphorically equivalent to trying to lose one’s
shadow, and it is these variations that Objectivity recounts. While its use as a word had
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been around since the era of the early Greeks, objectivity gained its status as a scientific
word, Daston and Galison (2007) argue, in the mid 19th century. The classic story of
modern, enlightenment era science owes its origins to principled people wresting control
of knowledge, creation and dissemination away from corrupt religious officials who
prompted events like Martin Luther’s posting of his 95 theses (Toulmin, 1990). Thus,
scientists moved to new ways of ensuring the truth of their discoveries and experiments,
adopting methods that could be replicated and scrutinized by respected peers. Objectivity,
for Daston and Galison, found traction as a word when scientists began to more seriously
reflect on what they saw as an increasing obstacle to scientific knowledge: themselves.
The irony this book points out is that objectivity itself has had to take on different human
morals, meanings and practices – to fit different expectations for objectivity.
Borrowing Foucault’s (1988) critical historical perspective, Daston and Galison
(2007) relate “objectivity” to the “epistemic virtues” associated with particular eras. In
their words, epistemic virtues are “norms that are internalized and enforced by appeal to
ethical values, as well as to pragmatic efficacy in securing knowledge” (p. 40). And it
isn’t just the values that change, the scientist practicing them changes as well, as different
conceptions of what it means to be objective are taken up, or held out expectedly of
scientists. The ascetic nerds of mid-20th century objective science were quite different
from mid-19th “truth-to-nature.” artistically scientific, practitioners. While many may be
quite prepared to accept that aesthetic tastes, technology, and ways of communicating
might vary with time, the notion that the seeming linchpin of science, objectivity, might
similarly change with the times can be unsettling. The authors are not talking here about
the classic evolving scientific narrative where things converge on ultimate truths and
correct practices. No; as other similarly ambitious historical projects, such as Charles
Taylor’s (1989) review of the self, Foucault’s examination of madness, or Norbert Elias’
(2000) account of civility show – the human virtues of one’s day can be somewhat fickle.
Daston and Galison trace objectivity through different identifiable phases, with very
different conceptions for being an objective scientist.
The first era, one that preceded modern attempts at objectivity, relates to the
scientific effort to capture nature “as it was” through artistic re-presentation. The trouble
here, however, is that to come up with such a re-presentation one had to standardize or
idealize nature’s variability into a typical, but “pure”, snowflake, for example. This kind
of re-presentation was done for one of the most important scientific endeavours of that
era: classifying and representing biological, geological and other phenomena. The notion
of capturing these phenomena – in their “purity” – was a scientific obsession, meant to
help the re-presenter get closer to nature’s beauty and secrets, to make them recognizable
and classifiable. Thus, many key science books of this era featured spectacularly detailed
drawings of these “pure” phenomena, and Objectivity itself features many such drawings.
With the advent of daguerreotypes and cameras, the view that nature could be
differently represented – without the taint of human idealism and standardization –
ushered in what Daston and Galison (2007) described as the first modern era of
objectivity: mechanical objectivity. Here is what they have to say about it:
By mechanical objectivity we mean the insistent drive to repress the
willful intervention of the artist-author, and to put in its stead a set of
procedures that would, as it were move nature to the page through a strict
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protocol, if not automatically. This sometimes meant using an actual
machine… (p. 121)
Qualitative researchers may find themselves having a little déjà vu in reading this
definition, as might those enamoured with qualitative data analysis software. The key to
this “epistemic virtue”, however, is the explicit attempt to take out the human element
from the research, to make the research processes and products objective, or in the words
of our authors: “the machine stood for authenticity” (p. 129). In making this particular
move toward objectivity, a new kind of policing, a la Foucault (1988), takes hold as peer
review, scientific “self-scrutiny,” and scientific expectations generally, are tasked with
ferreting out any traces of subjectivity, and to hold such transgressions up for scientific
scorn and dismissal. Pages of pictures of machinery, and of the products of machinery are
placed in alongside this account of the era of mechanical objectivity, and of the scientific
loyalties expected.
However, something about mechanical objectivity fell short of developments both
within science and beyond; it “was costly – in different contexts it demanded sacrifices in
pedagogical efficacity, color, depth of field, and even diagnostic utility” (Daston &
Galison, 2007, p. 179). Mechanically trying to reproduce the world, to show objectivity
and scientific self-restraint, left some things out that scientists and society at large wanted
– of the self as well. In tracing these shifting expectations of the scientist, they write,
…genius migrates from well-stocked memory to steely will, as the self is
reconceptualized first as a congeries of faculties, then as a will-centered
monolith. Moral imperatives shift accordingly, to combat first the
temptations of the imagination and then subjectivity. Quests for truth and
quests for objectivity do not produce the same kind of science or the same
kind of scientist. (p. 232)
What was needed, as these deficiencies in mechanical objectivity were becoming
evident, was a science that could better attend to how things purportedly were, as nature’s
structures. With structural objectivity came a focus on measurement, logic, replicable,
empirical sequences reliant on the pristine senses and dispassionate reasoning of the
scientist. For those familiar with Husserl’s phenomenological project, it was an attempt to
“get to the things themselves,” to experience reality first hand; or in our authors’ words:
“Nature, like Luther’s Bible, should require no interpreter” (Daston & Galison, p. 260).
For post-structuralist readers of this review, this will read as a naïve ontology in which
nature speaks to the scientist if she or he will only properly listen. But, listening properly
came with added abstractions: numbers, a priori names, formulae, observational,
measuring instruments, and so on. Missing from the structuralists’ account of their
scientific practice was an acknowledgment like this, from Gregory Bateson, “When the
investigator starts to probe the unknown areas of the universe, the back end of the probe
is always driven into his own vital parts” (as cited in Keeney, 1983, p. 129).
Structures owe something to the schemes of intelligibility that people use to
identify them as such. In my profession of family therapy, this would be how my training
might help me see a problematic pattern of family interaction where my psychology
colleagues would see examples of individually diagnosable psychopathology. The idea
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here was that the discernment of such structures owed something to the closer-to-reality
objective empiricism of the scientists who could flatten their affects, crank up their
senses, and report “what was there.” It was the ability to recognize “what was there” that
came to be a problem – a problem of training (remember: humans were originally
supposed to get structural reality because of their raw powers of observation). Thus, to
become objective required being steeped in particular ways of training one’s objectivity
to see the structures a science requires. By this logic, a cellular biologist, a geneticist, an
anthropologist, and a psychologist can each look at a human being and come up with
different structural accounts of the same person – all objectively one should add.
At the heart of this book that traces such developments in scientific objectivity is
an account of science’s varying objections to subjectivity. As Daston and Galison (2007)
contend, “Objectivity and subjectivity are expressions of a particular historical
predicament, not merely a rephrasing of some eternal complementarity between a mind
and the world” (p. 379). This is a very hermeneutic view of both science and the concept
of objectivity, not unlike Richard Bernstein’s (1983) consideration of the subject 25 years
ago, though the focus here is more explicitly on the history of science.
For the average qualitative researcher, this book offers some “dirt” on a
sometimes opponent: quantitative science that uses largely structural (ergo: “objective”)
research premises, methods and outcomes. You are not likely to win any converts in
arguments with structuralist colleagues, but, seeing science’s broader history you may
develop sympathies for the dilemmas qualitative researchers have met square on in
gaining legitimacy for their very human, and still quite accountable, approaches to
science.
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